Personal Website of Ken Pascoe
A series that documents additions to the Practices & Techniques document I've been writing here at V for the last three years.
One of my first tasks when I arrived at V Australia in early June 2008 was to watch simulator transition training being conducted at our new simulator in Silverwater, Sydney. The students were straight off the street pilots who had come from regional airlines – in most cases it was their first jet, their first [...]
With pilots coming from a number of other aircraft types and several different airlines, including a domestic fleet, standardisation can be a challenge. The use of Flaps on approach has been in particular an interesting issue, which is hopefully address clearly in the following article.
The next phase of refresher training includes dispatch without the benefit of Electronic Checklist (ECL). No ECL requires some (very) rusty skills on the part of our Glass Cockpit Crews. This is going to such fun to watch …
The recent recurrent training phase included a SLATS DRIVE failure during takeoff at high weight. At some point, the crew is confronted with the decision about whether to retract flap or not. The results of doing so would not be so amusing had I not done the same myself ……
The last phase of recurrent simulator training included a two engine go-around after a Slats Drive failure. For no apparent reason the AP/FD pitches to less than 10 degrees and accelerates well through Flap Limit speed. According to Boeing, this is expected behavior.
Recently a crew in the sim elected to hold until the completion of the Fuel Imbalance checklist before commencing an Approach. Since fuel balancing can take quite some time, they were in for a long wait …
I was recently asked to confirm that 5 knots is added to the Vref Speed on final approach when an unusual Vref is specified by the Non Normal Checklist. I eventually found a reference …
It’s not unusual – especially during Line Training (instructors beware) for your student to generate an EICAS MAIN GEAR STEERING alert during the initial takeoff run. This results from advancing thrust prior to the main articulated gear achieving a lock during the initial takeoff roll.
I’ve been operating under the miss-understanding that if the visibility observed at the airport matches the minimum required to commence the approach – you’ll have a reasonable chance of completing the approach to a landing. As it turns out – for JAR OPS compliant NPA’s – this is not the case.
When you’ve been on an aircraft for almost 15 years, especially a modern Boeing, you think it’s ability to surprise you is behind you. Mostly – that’s true. And then …
9/26/11
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