After a debacle in Abu Dhabi – and another occurrence involving offload and a 4 hour delay – I was asked to prepare some specific advice for Captains operating out of Abu Dhabi. Background Due to high temperatures, most Abu Dhabi departures during mid-Summer experience a potential performance penalty for departure; in most cases resulting […]
Boeing won’t tell you what you want to know (which is usually everything) about a NnM – just what you Need to know.
So last year was a COVID Airline Industry sh!tshow and the upshot was (after being made redundant from the Virgin 777 operation) – I was fortunate to find myself on a BAe146 course. At least in part, my recruitment was based on my technical and computer skills (as opposed to any dubious potential to point […]
The next phase of refresher training includes dispatch without the benefit of Electronic Checklist (ECL). No ECL requires some (very) rusty skills on the part of our Glass Cockpit Crews. This is going to such fun to watch …
With pilots coming from a number of other aircraft types and several different airlines, including a domestic fleet, standardisation can be a challenge. The use of Flaps on approach has been in particular an interesting issue, which is hopefully address clearly in the following article.
Recently I was given a runway change on pushback. Despite operating out of LAX where runway change is a real likelihood, it’s been quite a while since I’ve had happen to me on taxi. Once we got the changes made – we ran the ECL Runway Change Checklist to tidy things up. Meanwhile our next […]
Weather avoidance is part and parcel of an airline pilot’s standard task list. From the Mark One Eyeball to the Rockwell Collins WXR-2100 Weather Radar there are various tools available to assist in this task; all of which leverage the training and experience an airline pilot brings to the flight deck. But my last trip […]
Many years ago when I was a junior FO new to the 777, I did one of my first recurrent checks in the simulator with an Examiner who started asking questions about the takeoff inhibits system. After several such questions – of both the Captain and myself – it became increasingly apparent that not only […]
So after a carefully walk around the outside of the aircraft where the Static and Pitot ports are checked un-obstructed; no indications from your EICAS that there are any problems with the Air Data System during taxi; you barrel down the runway, cross check the airspeed when you hear the call “Eighty Knots!” and see […]
A runway change can be highly destructive to mental model the crew establish during preflight of the aircraft departure. Dozens of decisions, selections and entries are often required to be evaluated and implemented – often while the engines are running and aircraft are waiting behind you.
There has been some discussion recently around FMC scratchpad messages, their role in flight deck alerting, and an appropriate crew response. Most particularly around the habit that some crew develop – usually during transition simulator training when many spurious messages are generated and often cleared without real understanding of their meaning). We areseeing this in the sim […]
An engine failure at altitude above the maximum engine out altitude, followed by the obligatory engine out drift down is a bread and butter event for a cruise pilot. Typically this is practiced and evaulated using the highest levels of automation in LNAV and VNAV. For more information see Engine Out Drift Down and the […]
The last phase of recurrent simulator training included a two engine go-around after a Slats Drive failure. For no apparent reason the AP/FD pitches to less than 10 degrees and accelerates well through Flap Limit speed. According to Boeing, this is expected behavior.
In another article, I discuss the issue of acceleration and cleanup in the missed approach. The Boeing 777 FCTM mentions accelerating at 1000 ft (AAL) in the missed approach, and many airlines use this point on two engine missed approaches. As discussed – this is inappropriate and potentially dangerous in the event of a single […]
As Boeing’s first Fly-By-Wire aircraft (although not necessarily fly-by-wire by the Airbus definition) the 777 introduced a flight control augmentation system that the first fly by wire Airbus aircraft did not – Thrust Assymetry Compensation, or TAC. The basic problem is clear. During an engine failure on a twin wing-mounted engine aircraft there is an […]
