Weather avoidance is part and parcel of an airline pilot’s standard task list. From the Mark One Eyeball to the Rockwell Collins WXR-2100 Weather Radar there are various tools available to assist in this task; all of which leverage the training and experience an airline pilot brings to the flight deck. But my last trip […]
A while ago I was looking into tail clearances on takeoff, rotation technique and most importantly what tools were available to train and evaluate rotation technique in the simulator and the aircraft. As part of this review the question was raised about the calling of “Rotate” on takeoff and the initiation of the rotation manoeuvre […]
In another article, I discuss the issue of acceleration and cleanup in the missed approach. The Boeing 777 FCTM mentions accelerating at 1000 ft (AAL) in the missed approach, and many airlines use this point on two engine missed approaches. As discussed – this is inappropriate and potentially dangerous in the event of a single […]
I was recently asked whether we could still use LNAV to fly a Localizer Instrument Approach, and whether that was the preferred mode. This question was asked during a briefing on PBN which has caused some confusion. Recently we’ve seen some changes in the way we do aircraft Navigation, or at least in the way […]
A not-so recent amendment to the B777 FCTM (followed by a more recent update to the FCOM and QRH) instigated a procedure where ENG OUT mode of the FMC VNAV page is selected (confirmed) and EXECuted once CONtinuous thrust has been set after takeoff. While this sounds logical and orderly – as usual the devil […]
Some time ago I wrote about a review of a Decision Making Model (FORDEC). During that article I clarified that there is a clear difference between a Decision Making Model versus a Non Normal Management Model. Usually you have to deal with the NNM first before you get as far into the flight as having […]
There has been some discussion recently around FMC scratchpad messages, their role in flight deck alerting, and an appropriate crew response. Most particularly around the habit that some crew develop – usually during transition simulator training when many spurious messages are generated and often cleared without real understanding of their meaning). We areseeing this in the sim […]
This failure seems simple enough – one of the engines is low on oil pressure; the checklist reduces thrust and shuts down the affected engine. Then there’s the reality of dealing with an engine NNM under various conditions of high altitude and high thrust settings. This failure has something of a history in 777 simulator […]
One of my first tasks when I arrived at V Australia in early June 2008 was to watch simulator transition training being conducted at our new simulator in Silverwater, Sydney. The students were straight off the street pilots who had come from regional airlines – in most cases it was their first jet, their first […]
There is (what can only be described as) a software bug in the Thrust Reference setting software in the 777. While this bug manifests itself in several situation on normal and non-normal operations, it manifests significantly with flight safety implications during VNAV engine out approaches. I discovered this issue back in the late 90’s when I […]
![B777 EICAS [] FUEL SCAVENGE SYS](https://www.infinidim.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/FuelSys.jpg "FuelSys")
When you’ve been on an aircraft for almost 15 years, especially a modern Boeing, you think it’s ability to surprise you is behind you. Mostly – that’s true. And then …
I’ve been operating under the miss-understanding that if the visibility observed at the airport matches the minimum required to commence the approach – you’ll have a reasonable chance of completing the approach to a landing. As it turns out – for JAR OPS compliant NPA’s – this is not the case.
Recently I conducted some research into the concept of the requirement for the Pilot Flying (PF) to guard the flight controls when the autopilot is engaged during critical phases of flight such as takeoff or landing. Something I thought was clear cut – is apparently not.
It’s not unusual – especially during Line Training (instructors beware) for your student to generate an EICAS MAIN GEAR STEERING alert during the initial takeoff run. This results from advancing thrust prior to the main articulated gear achieving a lock during the initial takeoff roll.
I was recently asked to confirm that 5 knots is added to the Vref Speed on final approach when an unusual Vref is specified by the Non Normal Checklist. I eventually found a reference …
