Some time ago I wrote down all that I had been taught and learned about operating the Boeing 777 Electronic Checklist (ECL) in conjunction with the onboard Electronic Indication and Crew Alert System (EICAS). I’ve updated it along the way as I became an instructor and it’s become more and more of a formal document […]
This failure seems simple enough – one of the engines is low on oil pressure; the checklist reduces thrust and shuts down the affected engine. Then there’s the reality of dealing with an engine NNM under various conditions of high altitude and high thrust settings. This failure has something of a history in 777 simulator […]
Recently a crew in the sim elected to hold until the completion of the Fuel Imbalance checklist before commencing an Approach. Since fuel balancing can take quite some time, they were in for a long wait …
An engine failure at altitude above the maximum engine out altitude, followed by the obligatory engine out drift down is a bread and butter event for a cruise pilot. Typically this is practiced and evaulated using the highest levels of automation in LNAV and VNAV. For more information see Engine Out Drift Down and the […]
Recently I witnessed an interesting occurrence on the line that has resulted in a number of queries to Boeing, and while not all the answers are back, the results so far are fascinating. Eighteen years on the aircraft and still learning, which is actually a nice place to be. Disclaimer : Normally I try to […]
Friend and fellow podcaster Karlene Pettit recently blogged on managing the A330 speed/configuration during approach. I thought it might be interesting to explore the topic on the 777. The point of Karlene’s article is that often the manfacturer’s profile doesn’t comply with the ATC environment we find ourselves in, and the performance characteristics of the aircraft we fly are such […]
I was asked recently to write for an internal newsletter to provide some Boeing 777 specific information to non-777 pilots on the role of the 777 Autopilot Flight Director System (AFDS) and Autothrottle in the Asiana 214 accident. The following article is based on that contribution.
It’s not unusual – especially during Line Training (instructors beware) for your student to generate an EICAS MAIN GEAR STEERING alert during the initial takeoff run. This results from advancing thrust prior to the main articulated gear achieving a lock during the initial takeoff roll.
What’s been missing for our documentation for some time is decent diagrams showing the normal procedures flows. The B777 normal operation centers around these flows, and the normal procedure ECL checklists that follow. For Normal Operations – the ECL Checklist is a “Done” list, where all then items you run through on the checklist should […]
The next phase of refresher training includes dispatch without the benefit of Electronic Checklist (ECL). No ECL requires some (very) rusty skills on the part of our Glass Cockpit Crews. This is going to such fun to watch …
Ken : The following article is written by a current B737 First Officer, after a discussion we had on Flight Deck Crew Dynamics. Have you ever been in the situation as the Pilot Flying where your off-sider has interfered with the Mode Control Panel (MCP) or lowered the landing gear without you asking? If so, […]
We’ve become so reliant on GPS that the loss of it will come as quite a shock to today’s airline crew. The simulator doesn’t help – with a total inability to adequately simulate IRS drift. The issues are complex …
Currently I’m evaluating research on the roles of the Captain vs the First Officer in the detection and correction of procedural errors on the flight deck. Fortunately I’m not looking at our entire operation, just one small corner of it. First, some background. Delaying Final FMC Performance Data Entry Our SOP’s are pretty much based on Boeing’s […]
There is (what can only be described as) a software bug in the Thrust Reference setting software in the 777. While this bug manifests itself in several situation on normal and non-normal operations, it manifests significantly with flight safety implications during VNAV engine out approaches. I discovered this issue back in the late 90’s when I […]