While it’s far too early to tell what actually happened, in light of EK521 it’s perhaps germane to re-visit a topic that I wrote about in my Procedures and Techniques document quite some time ago – the Rejected Landing. As a reminder – the text of that entry into my tome is below, along with Boeing’s paragraph from the FCTM.

The Boeing text on this fairly unique maneuver is pretty quick and bland. In no way does it hint at the hands and feet going everywhere this exercise can become when it’s taught to pilots during their initial training onto the aircraft type. I recently completed training this exercise in the simulator to two new Captains transferring onto the 777, and as always I ensured each trainee had at least two goes at it; one to make the mistakes; one to learn and apply the lessons; sometimes a third to turn it into a maneuver that holds no mystery and less challenge.

That’s both the beauty and the trap of the simulator. It’s actually quite a challenge to introduce this maneuver into a simulated training environment in such a way as to take the pilots under training by surprise. You’re not trying to do that in transition training anyway – the lesson plan in full is pre-briefed and the techniques and procedures that will be used in response to pre-programmed events discussed at length so that everyone involved can get the most from their time in this expensive device.

But when it comes to training qualified line pilots – being able to instill?parameters into a developing situation on an approach that will lead to a genuinely surprising need for a rejected landing maneuver is actually quite challenging. But that’s exactly what you need. When it comes to rejected landing – no line pilot is going to get a couple of goes at it to get it right in the aircraft; and when it comes, the requirement to perform the maneuver well enough may be a complete surprise.

A bounced landing in particular may well come off an unstable approach and therefore be a foreseeable incoming maneuver for the pilots concerned – but equally it can all go pear-shaped in the last 100 ft with wind and temperature shifts that take a slightly less aware pilot into the runway with some force – and probably back up again. Then you’re firmly in the potential rejected landing regime.

In some ways – much like AAR214 it is often the case that the automation is not the reliable friend in this scenario that it usually is for the pilots. Once you’ve touched down the inherent automation paradigm is slowing down and stopping. Given enough time on the ground (and?in fact, not all that much time) the spoilers deploy up off the wings to spoil lift and push the aircraft down onto the wheels, where the automatic braking is just about to kick in.

The TO/GA switches which would have initiated a go-around (commanding a Pitch UP indication and an actual Thrust Increase) only a few seconds before; are now disabled until the aircraft registers airborne again. Thus the pilots who are heavily reliant on the relatively automatic response to the TO/GA switches may not get what they have been trained to expect by practice and preaching.

But it’s still a Boeing.

Push the thrust levers forward – and there will be thrust.

Pull back on the controls – and the aircraft will pitch up if there’s any airspeed at all – even if there’s not quite enough airspeed yet; there’ll still be enough pitch up and start a pretty sprightly climb away from the ground.

But sometimes, we forget that – pushing the buttons we’ve been told to push and waiting for the Flight Director to tell us what to do now …

Procedures and Techniques : Rejected Landing Procedure

Boeing FCTM

A rejected landing is a manoeuvre performed when crew decide to action a go-around after the aircraft has touched down. The reasons for this are few, but included in them would be a late landing with potentially insufficient runway to complete the landing roll safely.

Note that this could occur after speed brake deployment, but prior to reverse thrust application. The application of the reversers commits the aircraft to the landing.

While the FCTM documents Go-Around after Touchdown, the following points should be noted about the Boeing procedure.

• Go-Around after Touchdown is actioned using normal go-around procedures (see FCOM NP and QRH MAN)
• After touchdown, the TOGA switches will be inhibited ? thrust application will be fully manual (maximum thrust should be used) and the flight directors will not give correct indications until the TOGA switches are used airborne.
• Be aware that the stabiliser trim may not be set correctly and control forces may be unusual during rotation.
• Speed brakes will stow and auto brakes will deactivate when the thrust levers are advanced sufficiently.
• A takeoff configuration warning is typically generated as the thrust is advanced with landing flap.
• Once airborne, the TOGA switches should be selected to provide normal FMA/Flight Director/Auto Throttle go-around.

The introduction of the [] VNAV STEP CLIMB checklist highlights procedural handling of EICAS/ECL and the management of enroute climbing in the aircraft.

The FMC schedules step climbs throughout the flight based on the settings in the Cruise Altitude (CRZ ALT), Step Size (STEP) and potentially Step To (STEP TO) fields based on the aircraft weight, actual/forecast wind and temperature data and speed schedule (usually cost index). Additionally climb steps can be placed on the LEGS page of the FMC to schedule climbs at geographical waypoints in the flight plan, rather than the optimal weight/speed/wind schedule predicted by the FMC. What this all means is that for a long flight the FMC assumes that you will be able to increase your altitude as the flight proceeds, and calculates ETA and Fuel at Destination accordingly.

I remember when I first checked out on the 777, standard practice in my airline at the time was to set the Step Size to Zero during pre-flight and keep it there. In this way the fuel/time predictions for destination would be based on not getting any climbs – after all, how can you predict time/fuel based on climbs you may not get? At the time this was considered “conservative” and therefore safer. For shorter flights this was indeed unnecessarily conservative. For longer flights, it meant operating for half the flight with an “INSUFFICIENT FUEL” message flooding the CDU scratchpad … eventually wiser heads prevailed and we returned Step Size to the default value – which at the time was ICAO.

The “risk” here is that you may not get the climb(s) you need, but the FMC continues to assume you will. Indeed, if you pass a step climb point and don’t get a clearance, the FMC continues to calculate time and fuel assuming you’re just about to start a climb to the next step. This has been part and parcel of FMC’s of this type for decades and pilots haven’t been overly burdened by the requirement to monitor flight progress, seek climbs appropriately and deal tactically/strategically when we don’t get them.

For whatever reason, Boeing have implemented an EICAS message when the FMC Step Climb point is passed without an associated climb. This message, rather than just prompting crew to seek a climb, also comes with a full EICAS NNM checklist – although how this can be called a non normal is beyond me.

Purportedly this iniative came from the FAA’s involvement in extending ETOPS approvals for the 777 beyond 180 minutes. Rumour has it the checklist will benefit from further refinement in future blockpoint updates.

Can’t come too soon …

Long haul pilots tend to be pro-active about climbing and often seek climbs prior to the recommended step climb point. This is usually in an effort to avoid being blocked from higher levels by the increasing numbers of other aircraft on the more common routes. If you can get up there earlier, you’re more likely to be the one blocking, rather than finding yourself blocked from those fuel saving altitudes. Do it too early though and you’re punishing yourself, with deviation from optimum altitude typically being a 2:1 ration against being high – that is, you are approximately equally less efficient being 2000 ft above your optimum level as you are being 4000 ft below it.

In any event – Since ideally we probably don’t want to run an entire NNM checklist everytime we pass a step climb point without actually starting a climb, there are now several unofficial habits I’m seeing creep in that are being driven by the inclusion of this checklist. This includes manually setting a step climb point a waypoint or three down route while you wait for a clearance to climb. This isn’t bad technique as it at least “resets the timer” for the prompt to remind you to climb, and is in fact one of the responses within the checklist itself. Which waypoint should you choose? Well, the next one would seem to be the most obvious, but otherwise – the next one where you change FIR to another ATC unit isn’t a bad choice either. Perhaps Auckland will be more pro-active than Nandi in getting you that climb …

Another is setting the step size to an increasing value, or to set the Step To altitude higher than 2000 (RVSM) or even 4000 (ICAO) to delay the climb reminder.

Another is to ignore the EICAS and leave the message there until you get your step climb. While definitely within the purview of the crew – this response doesn’t keep a clear EICAS which is something we actively encourage.

Another is to override the checklist instead of running it. This is definitely no recommended, since you’re effectively removing the checklist (if not the message) from serving it’s intended function – dealing with a situation on board the flight deck that the manufacturer has decided you shouldn’t be ignoring.

On top of these techniques is running with the actual checklist occurrence itself. As you can see the checklist is a essentially a decision tree that says

– Step climb is needed Now? – Then Climb! (Doh!)
– Step climb is needed Later? – Use the LEGS page to delay the Step.
– Step climb is NOT needed? – Remove all Step Climbs by entering 0 into the FMC VNAV CRZ page Step Size.

Of course what’s missing here is :

– Step Climb is Needed but ATC won’t give it to you? Ok then ….

The last action in the actual checklist (Step Size Zero) of course removes all reminders that a step climb is ever going to be needed for the rest of the flight, and is typically only the relevant choice towards the end of the flight when you are either unable to obtain or decide you don’t need that last increase in altitude. Setting 0 in the Step Size too early in a long flight will give you a falsely low estimate of fuel on board at destination (which contrary to common belief may not be the most conservative indication); as well as potentially an inaccurate estimate of your arrival time. Finally – find yourself forced down this path early enough and your FMC will continually be telling you you have INSUFFICIENT FUEL all the way to your destination (or not); or at least until you do get a climb. And we’re back to my Airbus airline of the mid 90’s that couldn’t learn from it’s Boeing pilots.

In the end this conundrum of what action to take when you aren’t able to climb straight away – or at all – enroute is something pilots have be dealing with since ATC was invented. I’m not convinced we needed a checklist to highlight it to us.

With the airline industry moving progressively towards GPS and GPS Augmented based approaches and away from the more traditional ground based navigation aid approaches, the use of LNAV/VNAV – with all it’s eccentricities – are becoming the norm for many airlines, rather than the exception.

The boon of flying such approaches more often is that your crews develop a body of expertise, particularly in regards to those eccentricities – but at the same time you expose crews to the vagaries of approach types that were previously not the norm, and to some degree were perhaps not designed from the ground up to be a mainstream solution for approach and landing.

Note : Stating that “VNAV may not have been designed from the ground up to be a mainstream solution for instrument approach” may sound a little harsh – but can you really look at the full scope of VNAV and it’s implementation across the various phases of flight from Departure to Destination (and go-around) and not shake your head and asked if someone really designed it to be this way?

Case in point is the requirement to intercept a VNAV Path based approach from above the programmed slope. For pilots coming from a precision approach – intercepting an electronic glideslope from above is less than ideal, but a documented procedure in the Boeing FCTM using Vertical Speed (VS) is provided.

The fundamental underlying assumption of this capture maneuver however is that the AFDS Glideslope (GS) mode is armed and will capture as the aircraft closes in on the electronic glideslope from above, hence providing protection against a below path situation developing during what can be a high workload phase of flight. There is no such armed mode in relation to VNAV – it’s either engaged (VNAV SPD/PTH) – or it’s not. Hence using VS to capture VNAV PTH approach from above is not considered appropriate.

Instead VNAV SPD is used. In this context – where VNAV is selected when more than 150 ft above the programmed approach path – VNAV SPD is an idle thrust descent mode, and the elevators will command speed without deviation (as far as possible).

Once the thrust levers reach IDLE (or earlier, if the PF overrides the thrust setting) – the PF can vary the thrust to control the rate of descent. Unless the rate of descent is excessive in regards to your Airline’s maximum rate of descent in the terminal area, retaining idle is usually the norm. The more likely requirement is to increase the rate of descent to expedite descent on the Flight Management Computer (FMC) approach path – using judicious Speedbrake.

Note that the MCP Altitude Selector is still a command instrument in this case – if you fail to capture the approach path before the relevant point on the approach – you’ll end up with VNAV ALT capture (ie: VNAV wants to go somewhere, and the MCP ALT-itude selector is in the way …). The MCP Altitude Selector also interferes with the progression of the approach down final, resulting in a capture anytime you forget to set a lower altitude, or the Missed Approach Altitude once that setting becomes appropriate. Refer back to the previous note on the designed-from-the-ground-up-NOT comment on VNAV.

It can therefore be seen that VS is not an appropriate mode. While it gives more direct control of the rate of descent (which may well be desirable) – the inability to arm VNAV means that the PF would be required to select VNAV when approaching the path – exposing the aircraft to a below path scenario in the event of a distraction (when was the last time there was a distraction just before an instrument approach …)

DP – thanks for the suggestion!

An engine failure at altitude above the maximum engine out altitude, followed by the obligatory engine out drift down is a bread and butter event for a cruise pilot. Typically this is practiced and evaulated using the highest levels of automation in LNAV and VNAV. For more information see Engine Out Drift Down and the FMA. However the ability to execute this maneouvre using basic autopilot/flight director modes is occaisionally tested – and a useful procedure to have when VNAV fails to do what you expect …

There are a couple of reasons why you might find yourself with the requirement to initiate and manage a basic modes engine out drift down from altitude, including a failure of VNAV to behave as expected/required – but the most common reason is because a Check Captain asks you to.

Broadly speaking the procedure required falls into one of two possibilities – when the FMC VNAV Cruise page is available; or when it’s not. When the FMC is there to give you an altitude and speed to aim for, you set those as part of the procedure shown here. Otherwise initial values of FL150 (or higher if MSA requires) and Turbulence Penetration speed are used until these can be refined using the QRH Performance Inflight.

Once VNAV is out of the picture, there are only two modes available for the descent – Vertical Speed (VS) or Flight Level Change (FLCH).

VS would be a high workload solution since fundamentally you are looking for a speed targeting manoeuvre (which VS is not), and without the constant attention of the PF, VS at high altitudes can risk overspeed / underspeed excursions. Hence FLCH is the mode of choice for a basic modes drift down.

However since FLCH is an idle thrust mode and you want to minimise the rate of descent, the Autothrottle is disconnected and CON thrust is set manually. This is done using the Thrust Lever Autothrottle Disconnect Switches so as to leave the Autothrottle armed (not the MCP Autothrottle Arm Switches). Note that the Autothrottle is disconnected after FLCH is selected, since engaging FLCH after would re-engage the Autothrottle.

If the engine is actually failed (either EICAS [] ENG FAIL or the Fuel Control Switch in Cutoff) then when FLCH is selected, the CON thrust limit will be set, and the PF must move the thrust levers as required to maintain the CON thrust limit. If necessary, the CLB/CON switch should set CON thrust limit manually (but not not the actual thrust setting).

I’m working on an update to the Practices and Techniques document I developed in 2008. While this has been a published document in my airline for several years, it was recently taken offline and is now a training background reference, as was the original intention for it’s development. Just one of the many subjects beng added is a section on whether to Stand the Crew Up during a Non Normal on the ground. Most particularly applicable to a Rejected Takeoff – this issue is the cause for much discussion at times.

[Read more…]

What’s been missing for our documentation for some time is decent diagrams showing the normal procedures flows. The B777 normal operation centers around these flows, and the normal procedure ECL checklists that follow. For Normal Operations – the ECL Checklist is a “Done” list, where all then items you run through on the checklist should be done before you open the checklist.

By far the most common error we see in the simulator in regard to the flows is forgetting to select the CHKL button at the appropriate time to display the next ECL normal checklist; closely followed by innapropriately displaying the checklist early.

Before Start Flow

The Before Start Flow is triggered once the CM2 has obtained Start/Push Clearance from ATC. During the flow the CM2 will action an EICAS Recall “Recall … Engine Shutdown“. CM1 responds “Cancel EICAS” to the message(s) read by CM2 this action triggers the associated CM1 Before Start Flow (Trims). At the end of the flow the CM1 calls for the “Before Start Checklist“. Once this is “Before Start Checklist Complete” the CM1 returns to the Ground Engineer and pushback/engine start commences.

Before Start Checklist

The Before Start Checklist is called for by the CM1 once the trims have been set in the CM1 Before Start Flow. This assumes the associated CM2 flow is complete and the Before Start Checklist has been displayed by the CM2.

• Flight deck door is verified by a visual check of the door and door arming mechanism by the CM2 as well as the center console door locking mechanism indications.
• Passenger signs are read as positioned “AUTO, ON” (NO ELECTRONICS / SEAT BELT selector positions).
• MCP V2, HDG/TRK and ALT should be called as selected, and verified appropriate. This includes the V1 (PFD vs CDU), V2 as displayed on the PFD (not just the MCP/CDU), an appropriate heading/track selection for the departure, and an Altitude selection appropriate for the (expected/cleared) departure clearance.
• T/O speeds are called as displayed on the CDU, but the V1 and the V2 should be verified on the PFD.
• CDU pre-flight confirms the completion of the CDU Pre-Flight Procedure as well as the Final FMC Performance Entry procedure. CDU-L should be set to the TKOFF REF page and CDU-R should be set to RTE Page 2 in preparation for the Departure Review.
• Fuel is read from the EICAS totalizer indication and no cross check against required fuel for departure (OFP) is scripted, although a mental check of this is a reasonable action.
• Trim commences with the Stabiliser setting as required from CDU-L and indicated on the Stabilizer Position Indicator. Note that prior to the completion of aircraft loading the stabilizer green band segments may not indicate correctly.

After Start Flow

The after start sequence is initiated after the second engine start. The associated CM2 After Start Flow commences automatically once the second engine EGT Start Limit has been removed.

Before Taxi Checklist

The Before Taxi Checklist is called for by CM1 after pushback/engine start is complete, the Engineer is disconnected and the flaps/flight control check is complete. The CM2 After Start Flow completes with the display of the Before Taxi Checklist.

• Anti-ice is called based on switch position as selected in the CM2 After Start Flow. Normally the challenge response would be “AUTO” but in icing conditions with the EAI selected on, the correct response would be “AUTO” (wing anti-ice), “ON” (left engine anti-ice), “ON” (right engine anti-ice).
• The EICAS Recall completed during the After Start Flow indicates aircraft serviceability status for flight.
• Ground equipment reflects the removal of pushback tug and personnel removed after pushback is complete. This check does not obviate the requirement to report Clear Left / Clear Right prior to aircraft taxi.

Departure Review

Once clear of congested areas and when workload is low, the PF will call for a Departure Review. This review of EFIS and other settings for the departure is conducted by the PM, and monitored by the PF during taxi. It completes with the display of the Before Takeoff Checklist (CHKL). WXR/TERR is only activated once CABIN READY has been received.

Before Takeoff Checklist

The Before Takeoff Checklist is displayed by the PM as part of the Departure Review flow. PF calls for the checklist once the Departure Review is complete and Cabin Ready has been received. The Before Takeoff Checklist can be done any time and does not need to be delayed until approaching the runway.

• Takeoff Flaps setting is closed loop and defined by the entry on the CDU TAKEOFF REF page.
• Cabin Ready displays on EICAS with a chime but is removed automatically after one minute.
• Once Cabin Ready is received and the Departure Review complete, PF/PM will select WXR/TERR as appropriate. This is typically PF/WXR & PM/TERR however there is non restriction in both crew being WXR or TERR as appropriate for the specific threats of the departure.

After Takeoff Flow

The After Takeoff Flow is commenced once the Flaps are selected UP. The PM should ensure that the flight stage is appropriate – low workload, low distraction environment. The Flow and the subsequent After Takeoff Checklist can wait until immediate terrain and weather clearance is assured, ATC is quiet, traffic is light and the immediate demands of the SID (tracking, speed, altitude) are met.

• The APU … OFF is only usually required after a Packs on APU takeoff.
• Similarly the PACKS … ON is only required after a PACKS … OFF takeoff
• Note that if a NNM has occurred during departure, the CHKL button should not be pushed as this would pre-empt the selection of a NNM checklist by the PF

After Takeoff Checklist

The After Takeoff Checklist is displayed by the PM once the Flaps are selected Up as part of the After Takeoff flow. PF calls for the checklist once the workload is low and the aircraft clear of terrain on departure. PF can use the removal of the Pitch Limit Indicators (PLI) from the PFD as a tip to call for the After Takeoff checklist – although at high weights at UP speed the PLIs may not be removed straight after flap retraction is complete because of proximity to the manoeuvre margin.

Descent Preparation

Descent preparation is typically conduct by the PF who may hand over control to complete the setup. As a guide, preparation consists of some or all of the following actions/considerations, in any order determined to be suitable.

• Recall EICAS and Operational Notes.
• Obtain ATIS and if appropriate, updated TAF for Destination and Alternate.
• Review weather and NOTAMS for arrival and diversion.
• Select most likely FMC Runway/Approach, STAR and Transition.
• Review Jeppesen Airport 10-7 Charts for specific station notes.
• Estimate Landing Weight and enter Flap Setting and VREF Speed. Consider likely groundspeed and Descent Rate on final.
• Set Approach Minima (Barometric and/or Radio Altimeter)
• Review and compare Jeppesen with FMC, cross-check LEGS page Tracks, Distances, Altitude and Speed Restrictions.
• Verify Approach, Missed Approach and Holding. For NPAs, validate FMC approach for LNAV and VNAV use.
• Verify Missed Approach Path against Chart. Consider the impact of auto-LNAV engagement if differences exist.
• Consider settings in NAV RAD, FIX, VNAV DES, DES FORECAST, OFFPATH DES, Approach RNP required, ALTN list.
• Assess likely arrival fuel and compare with Minimum Diversion Fuel required.
• Review Landing Distance Required and compare against Landing Distance Available.
• Consider likely taxiway exit and select an appropriate Autobrake setting.
• Review Taxi Route after landing in view of NOTAMS and likely parking stand.

Descent Checklist

The Descent Checklist is typically completed once the Arrival Briefing is completed. Like all normal checklists, the Descent Checklist is intended to be completed against actions that have been already completed.

• Recall verifies the aircraft status for the approach and landing and should be completed prior to the preparation for descent and approach.
• Similarly, Notes may contain restrictions or requirements that may well affect the choice of airport, runway or approach.
• Autobrake is chosen after a Landing Performance Assessment.

Landing Checklist

The Landing Checklist is displayed by the PM after selecting Flap 20 (irrespective of the landing flap setting). When calling for the Landing Flap setting, PF will add a call to complete the Landing Checklist “Flap 30 … Landing Checklist“. These two SOP requirements are important barriers to forgetting to run the Landing Checklist.

After Landing Flow

The After Landing Flow is actioned once the aircraft has reached Taxi speed, cleared all active runways, and the crew have received, briefed and understood the subsequent Taxi Clearance from ATC. The flow is actioned by the CM1 stowing the Speedbrake Lever – CM1 should not take this action until the aforementioned have been done. Should the aircraft be required to hold between two active runways – the speedbrake lever can be stowed and the flow completed while waiting. The flow completes (as they all do) with the EFIS CHKL switch to display the After Landing Checklist on the ECL

After Landing Checklist

The After Landing Checklist is displayed as the last item in the After Landing flow. The trigger to commence the flow is CM1 stowing the Speedbrake Lever after landing – irrespective of which pilot is PF

• The Speedbrake lever is stowed after landing by CM1 and commences the PM After Landing flow. CM1 should not stow the Speedbrake Lever until all active runways are cleared, taxi clearance is received and the taxi brief confirmed/updated. If the aircraft is required to stop/wait between active runways, the Speedbrake Lever can be stowed and the After Landing flow commenced.
• Strobe lights are left/turned ON while crossing any active runway after landing.
• Clearing the runway, the PF may call for the PM to select the ground maneouvre camera (CAM) onto the PM ND. Ideally the PF/PM should turn off the WXR on that side prior to displaying the CAM, since WXR cannot be deselected on that side once the CAM is displayed on the ND.
• Crew should be aware that extensive taxi after landing with the Flaps fully extended can be taken as a sign by ATC, particularly if communications with ATC has not been established.
• If TERR mode was in use on landing, this is deselected as part of the After Landing flow by the onside pilot.
• While this flow commences with the APU, starting the APU is typically delayed until approaching stand. At approximately 2 minutes prior to parking on stand the APU is started and the After Landing Checklist called for and completed.
• Occaisionally the taxi to stand after landing is extremely short. In this instance the crew should consider starting a clock once reverse thrust is deselected to provide a time for the minum engine cool down after landing (3 minutes). Starting the APU by recall late in the landing roll is usually a better choice rather than commencing the After Landing flow before receiving/briefing the taxi clearance.

Shutdown Flow

The CM2 Shutdown Flow commences once the N1s have reduce to 10% and CM1 switches the SEATBELT Signs … OFF.

Shutdown Checklist

The Shutdown Checklist is displayed as the last item in the Shutdown flow.

• The Parking brake is an item where the required state is not scripted and the CM1 calls whether the Parking brake is Set or Released. That said, best practice is typically to delay commencement of this checklist until the the ground engineer has confirmed that chocks are in place and the Parking brake is released. Crew should be aware that leaving the aircraft with the Parking brake set and chocks not in place leaves the aircraft liable to roll on inclines once residual hydraulic press as bled away.

Secure Flow

The Secure Flow is actioned once all passengers have left the aircraft. However if you’re handing over to the next crew these actions may not be required.

Secure Checklist

The Secure Checklist is commenced once all passengers have left the aircraft, and is to be completed anytime a handover to the next operating crew is not possible.

• We have no policy on the retention of the ADIRU state after shutdown since we currently dont operate any turn around flights. Other airliens typically leave the ADIRU on for times on ground of two hours or less, although cycling the ADIRU off for 30 seconds to force a realignment is standard practice.
• Packs are typically turned OFF for most of Virgin Australia operations as part of the Secure Checklist. This includes warm/humid countries where leaving the Packs on can causing icing issues after longer peroids on ground.

The Airspeed Unreliable scenarios is one of the more challenging non normals faced by pilots in the simulator. Of the many serious malfunctions I’ve witnessed crew deal with in the simulator – this one more than any other has caught crew out to the point of a serious limitation exeedence (high/low airspeed) or potentially an airframe loss. In the real world, this failure has killed people in the past, with the Air Peru B757 accident being the most common one that comes to mind. However accident and incident statistics are replete with this outlier failure that has recently become a major focus of the world’s airline training systems, most especially after the loss of Air France 447 in the Atlantic.

While the Air France and Air Peru events were clearly accidents of the first order with significant loss of life – unreliable flight instruments malfunctions have cause significant loss of control incidents that were eventually recovered. The following text is taken from another incident report, where a fully functioning set of co-pilot (and presumeably standby instruments) remained available to both crew. In spite of this the aircraft suffered signficant deviations of flight path owing to a combination of the autoflight and pilot inputs.

At 2203 the captain’s airspeed indicator increased from 276 to 320 knots and the captains altimeter increased 450 feet in approximately 5 seconds. To re-capture altitude, the autopilot commanded pitch down approximately 2 degrees. An overspeed warning activated whereupon the captain retarded the throttles to idle. The autothrottles disconnected automatically but the autopilot remained engaged. The autopilot pitched down another 2 degrees before pitching up approximately 8 degrees. The overspeed warning remained on for about 41 seconds. The captain disengaged the autopilot and manually initiated a climb. Thrust remained at idle and the captains airspeed indicator decreased to 297 knots. The captain increased pitch to 12 degrees nose up, his airspeed indicator rapidly increased to 324 knots producing a second overspeed warning. The aircraft climbed to an altitude of approximately 35,400 feet above sea level (asl), then started to descend. The captain’s indicated airspeed reached a maximum of 339 knots, before decreasing as the aircraft started to descend.

The aircraft was descending through 34,700 feet asl with the captain’s airspeed indicator decreasing through 321 knots and the overspeed warning on when the stick shaker activated (a stall warning device that noisily shakes the pilots control column as the stalling angle of attack is neared). The overspeed warning remained on for the next 20 seconds, became intermittent for 26 seconds, then stopped. The stick shaker activated intermittently for about 1 minute and 50 seconds from its initial activation. When the aircraft had descended through approximately 30 000 feet asl with the captains airspeed indicating 278 knots, the captain increased thrust and within 9 seconds the stick shaker stopped. As the aircraft descended through 29,100 feet asl, the captain’s airspeed indicator rapidly decreased from 255 knots to 230 knots and the airspeed fluctuations stopped. The aircraft continued its descent to 27 900 feet.

Throughout this event, the first officer’s airspeed indicator displayed information that was not indicative of an overspeed event.

The point here is that to a fully qualified, current and experienced crew, this is a failure that can present a significant challenge to retaining flight control and returning the aircraft safely back to the ground. The benefit of simulator training in this area cannot be under-estimated. The two thrusts of this simulator training should be:

1. Recognition and initial control; and
2. The procedures and techniques that will be required to return the aircraft safely to the ground with erroneous flight instruments, in various weather conditions.

This latter point is crucial. While it’s absolutely imperative that such training give crew the skills to recognise this failure and respond appropriately to regain/maintain control of the aircraft – the challenge inherent in returning a modern glass jet aircraft to the ground without functional airspeed/altimeter readings cannot be understimated. Except of course the 787 and the pilots that fly it – where with the flick of a switch airspeed is calculated from angle of attack and is accurate to about 5 knots. B@st@rds.

Recency & the Retention of Manual Flight Skills

A (previously) unspoken impact on this failure is the effect of a lack of aircrew skills and recency on basic instrument interpretation and maniulative skills. What this means is, pilots who spend most of their time either watching the autopilot fly, or following what the flight director tells them to do are in a poor position when these two marvelous systems are not available. Compounding this are crew who either don’t fly very often, or get little opportunity for manual flight.

I myself am a product of what is perhaps the worst combination of the various factors that impact my skills and my recency to perform my most basic task – hand fly the aircraft.

• While I learnt to fly on conventional instrumentation, I am fundamentally a child of the magenta line. My last 10,000 hours have been in EFIS glass flight deck Airbus/Boeing aircraft that were heavily automated, and typically subjected to airline automation policies that both encouraged the use of the highest levels of automation, and discouraged the practice of manual flight.
• As a long haul pilot (all sectors 12+ hours, augmented crew) I typically fly perhaps twice a month, which means 4 sectors, two of which (if I’m lucky) where I get to be the handling pilot. If the weather is reasonable and the airspace/traffic conditions conducive, and my partner (and myself) sufficiently alert – I can do some manual flying. Typically I make every attempt to do so, but my experience of flying with and watching other crew fly – I find myself an outlier in this. Much of the flying I see is “200 ft to 200 ft” with the autopilot used to nearly the maximum extent possible.
• Worse than this, I am a simulator instructor. Hence I fly slightly less than an average line pilot. Offsetting this is the fact that I have (limited) access to this fabulous million dollar toy in which I can practice my craft. Of course, things are never that simple and while our entire regulatory system is built around the concept that the simulator is just like the aircraft, I’ll let you in on a secret – it’s not. Coupled with this is the issue that while the ability to jump into the seat and do a takeoff or a landing to maintain/return legal recency is a simple thing – using the device properly to maintain the complete spectrum of of operational familiarty is not.
• Finally – I’m a Check Captain, This means that if I’m rostered with 3 flights this month (and by implication no simulator access because my roster is full at that point), typically two of those flights will be sitting on the jump seat watching other pilots fly. While it was clear that such activities have a detrimental impact on manual flying skills, at least you were part of the operation and therefore gaining valueable experience of watching other operate. Or so we used to think …

All this means that I have precious little opportunity to maintain these skills, and practically none to develop them.

Current regulatory requirements state I must have done a takeoff and landing in the last 45 days. This takeoff/landing doesn’t have to be on the same flight, and it can be (and is) accomplished in the simulator.

Why is the Simulator Different?

I’ve hinted before that the simulator is not like the aircraft. Which is a strange thing to say, given that this multi million dollar device probably has hundreds of millions of dollars and decades of research making every effort into making it so. Well, from a technical point of view – it’s pretty good. The “feel” is not quite the same, but as a device that serves as a next-best alternative to the aircraft, it does a great job.

The problem is in the way we use it.

While the simulator functions quite well as a tool to emulate a suitable environment for maneouvre practice – takeoff, landing, engine failure, instrument approaches, missed approaches, etc. – the problem is that while you can be trained to demonstrate technical competency in these maneouvres – it’s pulling them all together in the line operational environment where the “simulation” falls down. Sometimes in the aircraft the most difficult maneouvre to pull off without compromising safety is pushing the aircraft back and starting the engines [OTP]. There are so many people involved in this process that sometimes a Captain is like a traffic cop in the middle of a jam, rather than a manager steering the process while simultaneously mantaining the big picture awarness to safely integrate what must be done with would be nice to see done.

Simulators can provide this environment – but the preparation required of the instructors and the training management is extreme. This kind of simulation is called LOFT (Line Orientated Flight Training); or LOS (Line Orientated Simulation) – or when you’re being checked and not trained – LOE (Line Orientated Evaluation). While LOFT/LOS/LOE heavily influenced training thought up to a decade ago, many airlines seem to be back at that point where their training syllabii are driven towards a token half-session LOS/E; combined with multi-repositioning maneouvre training that completes set exercises as dictated by a regulatory matrix.

I might add some of these maneouvre are patently irrelevant to “modern” aircraft. In my 777 which was designed in the early 90’s and is now over 20 years old – we have to practice the failure of all primary flight instruments, a failure more appropraite to the aircraft of the 50”s, 60’s and perhaps 70’s. This basically means failing my two LCD screens (assuming I don’t just lean back and look at the two in front of my Co-pilot), each of which have a mean time between failure of something like 400,000 hours. So far in my 9000 hours/18 years on the 777 I haven’t had one fail – only 391,000 hours and 782 years to go before this check event that I have to do every year becomes beneficial …

When we step into a simulator perhaps 75% of the available time for training and assessment will be taken up by regulatory based maneouvre requirements. Matrix’s that dictate that each 6 months you must to an engine failure on takeoff in the lowest visibility with the engine failing at close to decision speed, for example. Not only this this simple exercise consume perhaps 20 minutes of simulator time – it dictates the nature of that section of the session – there must be a takeoff, it must be in low visibility, etc. The option of starting the session in mid flight nearing your critical diversion point over the pole goes out the window.

One final thing on skill retention. The rules that determine how often I must do a take off and landing to be legal to operate may or may not adequately address manual flight skills (or at least, the manual flight skills required to do a takeoff and landing) … but it does not address the wider skills required for manual flight in non-normal operations, nor does it consider “operational familiarity”, or if you like, recency as it relates to everything we do that doesn’t include takeoff or landing. Most particularly this means the cognitive skills that sits behind the manipulative ones. I recently came across an article on this in the Journal of Human Factors. The article itself is fascinating but the conclusions are both logical and startling; namely …

• After large gaps between flight exposure, the basic manipluative skills of piloting tend to fade slowly, and return quickly to a good level of proficiency with exposure.
• However after the same abscence, the cognitive skills required to operate safely and efficiently fade quickly and take more exposure to build to previous levels of proficinecy.

This second one is crucial. You can throw a pilot into a simulator after 45 days do a few takeoff/landings and be satisfied that as far as that skill goes, that pilot is good to go. But what about the cognitive aspoect. As a member of a small group of highly skilled, highly qualified pilots who seldom touch an aircraft, and have been this way for 8 years now – I can confirm that the least of my worries is takeoff, landing, basic flying. It’s everything else – and most particularly exposure to high workload situations that require practiced cognitive skills that present the greatest challenge to proficiency, efficiency – and safety.

To (finally) bring this round to the original heading – if you barely get the chance to practice hand flying the aircraft (while thinking at the same time) – how much harder is it going to be to respond correctly when your instruments are lieing to you?

Airspeed Unreliable Checklist

The Airspeed Unreliable checklist was revised in light of Air France AF447 to provide some short term figures for pilots to rely on. The basic intent of this change is to avoid the fixation that often occurs on airspeed and airspeed related alerts during this failure, to the exclusion of sensible pitch attitudes and power settings for existing aircraft configuration.

The settings promulgated in the checklist are designed to keep the aircraft in a safe (if not necessarily desirable) state of flight clear of high and low speed extremes for at least as long as it takes the crew to progress through the checklist to that point where they are looking up more appropriate values in the QRH. This may leave the aircraft in a climb or a descent, it may leave the aircraft at innapropriate (but safe) high or low airspeed compared to the normal flight regime. But safe.

It’s worth noting that the simulator leaves the Flight Path Angle displayed if selected. However while the FPA, PLI and Stick Shaker are fundamentally attitude based – all take airspeed as an input parameterfor validity checking. Boeing cannot guarantee that any of these will display, or will display correctly in the event of unreliable static/dynamic sources and hence the checklist warns against their use.

Cabin Altitude as … Altitude

In the event of a complete static port blockage, some crew have attempted to depressurise the simulator (Outflow Valves – Manual, Fully Open) to use the ASPC pressure sensor to provide an aircraft altitude through the Cabin Altitude display. This technique is technically (systemically) valid and will display an approximate aircraft altitude in a depressurised aircraft.

However it has been noted that when most crew takeoff with all static ports blocked (takeoff being the only time this is likely to occur), once crew recognise the malfunction, adopt the promulgated memory pitch attitude and thrust settings and commence the NNM checklist – by the time they achieve level flight in accordance with the QRH, they’re usually over 10,000 ft. Selecting the Outflow Valves open at this point would result in an EICAS [] CABIN ALTITUDE, followed by Oxygen Masks and a Rapid Descent – all while on unreliable flight instruments. As such this technique is not recommend by most Training/Standards Departments of the aircraft manufacturer. Using the Cabin Altitude earlier in this failure might indeed give you an altitude to maintain, but without valid power settings/attitudes, you’ll compromise your ability to maintain a safe airspeed until you get into the QRH.

I’m working on an update to the Practices and Techniques document I developed in 2008. While this has been a published document in my airline for several years, it was recently taken offline and is now a training background reference, as was the original intention for it’s development. Just one of the many subjects currently under revision is the section on Depressurisation Events – specifically the assessment of the Outflow Valve Position during an EICAS CABIN ALTITUDE or other related NNM’s that could lead to a Rapid Descent.

[Read more…]

I’m working on an update to the Practices and Techniques document I developed several years ago. While this has been a published document in my airline for several years, it was recently taken offline and is now a training background reference, as was the original intention of it’s development. Just one of the many subjects currently under revision is the section on Fuel Quantity Indication System (FQIS) – Totalizer vs Calculated Fuel. This comes after ongoing investigation of the fuel stratification issue (still unresolved).

[Read more…]

Weather avoidance is part and parcel of an airline pilot’s standard task list. From the Mark One Eyeball to the Rockwell Collins WXR-2100 Weather Radar there are various tools available to assist in this task; all of which leverage the training and experience an airline pilot brings to the flight deck. But my last trip illustrates the changes we’ve seen over the past few years in weather avoidance becoming a wider task that just the pilots on the flight deck, so I thought I’d share it here.

[Read more…]

In another article, I discuss the issue of acceleration and cleanup in the missed approach. The Boeing 777 FCTM mentions accelerating at 1000 ft (AAL) in the missed approach, and many airlines use this point on two engine missed approaches. As discussed – this is inappropriate and potentially dangerous in the event of a single engine missed approach as terrain clearance is not assessed. We use the Missed Approach Altitude MAA (or if lower/higher and more appropriate, the Minimum Safe Altitude MSA) instead. We use this point on both all engine as well as engine out go-arounds to maintain procedural consistency and reduce the likelihood of a crew acceleration (inappropriately) early on a single engine missed approach.

Recently I was asked about early ALT capture in the missed approach. The issue of concern was whether we could accept “early” acceleration in the missed approach when it’s associated with AFDS ALT capture. In essence – this is acceptable and in fact expected two engine go-around behavior.

Basically when you’re climbing up towards an altitude at which you intend to level off, the Autopilot Director Flight Director System (AFDS) is aware of this since it’s usually set in your Mode Control Panel (MCP). The AFDS monitors your current altitude, your rate of climb and your target MCP altitude during the climb (among other things …) and schedules a capture of the altitude earlier if your climb performance is good.

At some point you enter a capture range as you near the target altitude and an altitude capture mode engages in the AFDS. This is indicate by ALT on the Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA) and the AFDS either (a) commands the flight director to provide guidance for the level off; (b) commands the autopilot to action the level off; or (c) or both.

How early the capture phase begins is mostly dependent on your rate of climb. A rule of thumb when manually flying is 10% of your rate of climb. If you’re going up at 1000 ft/min – you can expect to have to begin the level off at 100 ft to go. My read of the AFDS is that it’s a little more sophisticated than that (one would hope so …) – it schedules level off much earlier than I would when manually flying – see the picture above. The AFDS level off process is?primarily limited by a “g” limit that the autopilot is is allowed to actuate through the flight controls – aimed at providing a smoother ride with less stomach pulling for the passengers.

Note : It’s worth noting that during climb you’re in a speed-on-elevator mode where speed control is provided through pitch (elevators). When leveled off – you’re in a speed-on-thrust mode where the autothrottle moves to protect speed. However during the capture you’re on neither.

I once had the capture mode described to me as “the aircraft following a pre-determined 3D path in space/time” by a particularly nerdy (but brilliant) Instructor – in which speed protection is NOT guaranteed. This 3D path is calculated at the commencement of the capture mode, and the AFDS follows it until the aircraft is levelled off. As such if the environmental or thrust conditions change during the capture process such that the initial calculated path is now invalid – all bets are off and pilot intervention may be required to protect speed and/or altitude. Supposedly the altitude capture mode does not heave the ability to re-calculate on the fly …

I’ve seen this myself on several occasions, where a change in MCP speed or thrust available – or resetting the QNH – completely throws the AFDS and a reversion to basic modes or manual flight is required. The classic scenario in the sim is to fail an engine in a two engine go-around just as the AFDS captures altitude early because of climb performance. Pilot intervention is almost always required as the aircraft tries to follow a 3D capture path based on 2 engines, using the thrust available from just one engine.

The missed approach – particularly the two engine missed approach – can be an extremely dynamic regime where large rates of climb – anywhere from 3000 to 5000 fpm – can “normally” be achieved. As such the capture phase can begin quite early, and owing to the dynamic nature of the maneuver – can seem too early for a normal level off.

This is where the question comes in. I recently encountered pilots who were intervening in the event of an early ALT capture off a two engine missed approach, because our SOP is to continue missed approach climb to the MAA. This is not required. On a two engine missed approach, the climb phase can be thought of as over when the AFDS enters ALT capture, even if it seems to be doing so well below the MAA. Early altitude capture is (usually) an entirely normal and appropriate action by the AFDS (or the pilot) and the SOP to climb to the MAA before accelerating was never intended to preclude this. In any case – on a two engine missed approach you’ll (almost) never be limited by?terrain clearance and commencing level off at an altitude below the MAA appropriate to the rate of climb is absolutely normal.?The issue doesn’t present on single engine go-arounds because the climb performance isn’t there to generate early captures.

None of this is of course intended to limit the PF/Captain from taking action in the event of inappropriate behavior of the AFDS – Fly The Plane.

A while ago I was looking into tail clearances on takeoff, rotation technique and most importantly what tools were available to train and evaluate rotation technique in the simulator and the aircraft.

As part of this review the question was raised about the calling of “Rotate” on takeoff and the initiation of the rotation manoeuvre itself. It seems an esoteric distinction but when the takeoff is critical – high weight, high density altitudes where limitations such as maximum tyre speed become a factor – it can be part of the problem of rotation technique.

Before you read on, answer honestly the following question – When do You start to pull back and initiate rotation on takeoff?

• When the PM calls “Rotate“; or
• When the airspeeds indicates you’ve achieved VR?

The answer of course comes from the FCTM.

The requirement for the PF to initiate rotation at VR rather than “Rotate” has some implications for takeoff. If you weren’t already – as the PF you should have airspeed in your scan (along with everything else) during the takeoff roll, particularly as you approach V1/Vr. Essentially as you hear the PM call “Rotate” – you should have already begun the control input; you should not be reacting to the call.

It’s a small difference (made bigger by any delay in the PM (Captain!) to call “Rotate“) but with the odd tyre speed exceedence seen in Abu Dhabi in the summer and occasionally Los Angeles at heavy weights – a difference that can bring you closer to an exceedence.

This concept provoked some discussions amongst the standards guys as to whether we should be calling “Rotate” a few knots early. Again – referring to the FCOM/FCTM – the answer is … No.

Background

Years ago when my previous operator transitioned from the awesome Boeing 777-200/ER’s to the even more awesome B777-300’s – prior to the ultimately awesome (… at least until the 777-X!) B777 300ER’s – we were concerned about the rotation technique our pilots were using in the -200 aircraft and how that would translate across to the far more critical -300 aircraft. I promise I won’t call anything else awesome for the rest of this page.

While training was provided in the simulator to Instructors (to teach/assess) and to Line Pilots (to do!) on takeoff rotation to refresh them in preparation for the -300’s; one of the most effective solutions was produced by Engineering.

After each takeoff in the aircraft, the onboard maintenance computer would print off a takeoff rotation report which listed some of the basic parameters associated with the rotation itself and allow the pilots to compare their own impression of the rotation manoeuvre as against the data itself. Pilots were heavily cautioned against reading too much into the data and reminded that the prime reference was the FCTM technique – but it was fascinating how often a rotation that felt slow, looked slow on the data; felt fast, looked fast on the data – or felt ok, looked slow or fast on the data. Over time we trained into our brains and muscle memories the correct technique using the aircraft itself as our guide. Quite cool really.

As an aside, I can remember several tailstrike incidents in the B777-300 (never the 300ER) during my time with my previous airline; all involved some fairly (not so) unusual (UK) weather with strong/gusty crosswinds involved. While information was never provided as to whether pilot technique was a factor – knowing as I did at least three?of the pilots in those occurrences, I really don’t think so.

Later the FCTM would be changed to recommend full TOGA thrust on all takeoff’s in strong and/or gusting crosswinds in all 777’s – an action which increases the tailskid margin on takeoff.

Boeing 777 Tailstrike Prevention Solutions

When the 777-300ER’s arrived they came with a software based tailstrike prevention system that would all but eliminate tail strikes. In fact to the best of my knowledge no 777-300ER’s have experienced a tailstrike in operational service – and the system had to be disabled during certification in order to produce the data necessary for unstick tests.

Across the various types of 777’s …

• B777-200/ER/LR/LRF : Has tailstrike detection – but no protection.
• B777-300 : Has tailstrike detection; separate tailstrike protection (physical tailskid); but no software based protection.
• B777-300ER : Has detection; Tailskid Protection (tailskid); plus a software based protection system and semi-levered main gear which pivot during rotation to reduce the likelihood of a tailstrike.

Tailstrike Detection Skid

Tailstrike Detection (All)

The detection system is a sensor/antenna mounted on the underside of the aircraft, not far past the point where the lower body tapers upwards towards the tail, and when activated alerts the flight deck that a [] TAILSTRIKE has occurred. This system is highly sophisticated, so to understand it – you need to read the next paragraph carefully.

Basically if you pull back hard enough during takeoff and drag the back end of the aircraft along the runway – you rip off this strategically placed orange fin, and an EICAS message goes off on the flight deck.

Highly sophisticated, wouldn’t you say? Still it seems to work.

In the event of an activation of this system – on any 777 – the checklist requires you to depressurise the aircraft and Land. Potentially you’ve done damage to the airframe, which could well be structural and include the cabin pressure cell.

Protection Skid/Cannister

Tailstrike Protection (Hardware, B777-300/300ER *)

The physical talkstrike protection cannister solution is a skid that retracts with the landing gear but during takeoff and landing provides a crushable cannister that absorbs the impact of a tailstrike. Note that you can drag this bit of kit along the runway – even crushing it – without activating the aforementioned detection system (no EICAS message). Apart from some harried calls from the crew and passengers – you might not even know it had occurred …?In any event in this circumstance it’s acceptable to continue the flight because the cannister has done it’s job of protecting the airframe, even if you failed to do so …

Accompanying this (B777-300ER only) is the implementation of the semi-levered landing gear which “consists of an additional hydraulic actuator that connects the forward end of each main gear truck to the shock strut. During takeoff, the actuator locks to restrict rotation of the main gear truck and allow takeoff rotation about the aft wheel axle, thereby improving airplane performance capability. During landing, the actuator is unlocked to permit rotation of the main gear truck and provide additional damping.”

We like to think that the aircraft essentially hops off the runway at the end of the rotation sequence …

Tailstrike Protection (Software, B777-300ER)

The 300ER’s come with a software innovation that assesses the likelihood of a tailstrike during takeoff based on a sea of parameters that include not only tailskid height but pitch attitude, rotation rate, airspeed as well as pilot control inputs. This is a solution that is a direct benefit from a fly by wire control system – there’s no doubt a stack of software in the background operating on a stack of data coming in at (I believe) 60 frames of information a second. Basically the system calculates how low the tail skid will be at the lowest point in the rotation – and if it believe that clearance will be less than 1.5 feet (yes – that’s 18 inches folks …) – it springs into action. Effectively?it reduces the pilot commanded elevator input, slowing the rotation of the aircraft, thereby preventing a tailstrike while continuing the rotation manoeuvre.

There is no pilot feedback, and no advisory to the crew that this has taken place. Depending on your airline’s setup – the flight deck, Engineering and/or Flight Operations Department could receive a report from the aircraft that the event has taken place, incorporating a subset of the data generated during the activation of tailstrike prevention.

Additionally an airline’s flight data monitoring (FDM) program that monitors digital data continuously for exceedences in a variety of parameters may well detect in the takeoff data indications an execeedence of various values such as fast/slow rotation rate; high rotation pitch attitude at liftoff, etc. It’s worth noting however that FDM captures data at about 5 times a second whereas TSP works on at least 12 times as much data – I’ve seen circumstances where the TSP has activated, but FDM never caught anything unusual (enough) on the takeoff to report.

* Finally – it’s worth noting that the software solution on the 777-300ER is so good that recently Boeing stopped placing the physical cannister tailstrike protection solution on the -300ER’s; this protection originally provided on the 777-300’s is no longer required and Boeing have been looking at rolling the software system back to the 777-300’s.

Resources

• Boeing Aero Q1/2007 : Tail Strikes : Prevention
• Boeing Frontiers TechTalk V3 Iss8 : Striking out tailstrikes
• A Human Factors Approach to Preventing Tail Strikes (Boeing, May 2004)

A not-so recent amendment to the B777 FCTM (followed by a more recent update to the FCOM and QRH) instigated a procedure where ENG OUT mode of the FMC VNAV page is selected (confirmed) and EXECuted once CONtinuous thrust has been set after takeoff. While this sounds logical and orderly – as usual the devil is in the details and the specifics of actioning this needs to be understood and considered by the PF/PM should they find themselves in this situation.

Specifically – executing ENG OUT at this point in time of the departure removes the VNAV climb page speed/altitude restrictions. Typically this means the loss of 250/10000 on most initial climbs – but also any other coded or entered VNAV Climb Page speed/altitude restrictions. At our typical operating weights (in excess of 320 tons) this usually means an ENG OUT climb speed of about 285 knots.

Interestingly, any LEGS page restrictions on climb speed remains in spite going to ENG OUT mode.

Is there really anything wrong with this? You could safely assume that in the event of a non normal such as an engine failure (whether MAYDAY or PAN PAN PAN) , you’re no longer subject to the 250/10K restriction. And you’d probably be right. But it’s best keeping everyone in the picture and asking/advising ATC before doing so.

Perhaps the biggest alarm bell that goes off for me when I see this is that when the aircraft accelerates after the execute – it takes the crew by surprise. Since this procedure is new and therefore most crew haven’t seen it done – they’ve never seen the removal of this restriction before either, so should I be surprised?

Except that they have seen it. Immediately between the “VNAV Engine Out … Confirm?” from the PM and the PF’s “Execute“, the FMC VNAV Climb page shows you the future – Maximum Altitude with Engine Out; Cruise Altitude, reset as required for single engine service ceiling; Engine Out Climb Speed … and no 250/10,000 speed restriction. But no-one spots it. The PM doesn’t call it; the PF doesn’t see it during the (peremptory) cross check required before the “Execute“. I agree that it’s easier to see things that appear and things that are marked inverse because they’ve changed; but our job description is not to only notice the obvious when making FMC changes.

What should you do in this situation? If your SA is high, you’ll notice the change in target speed, the control column input as a nose down input is applied, and the change in pitch attitude on the PFD. Assuming you weren’t aware of the coming change, I would expect you to speed intervene and maintain current airspeed, whether UP speed or 250 knots. The next time round, the solution would be to speed intervene before executing ENG OUT. Anything else is too fiddly with the CDU while at a high workload period of flight.

All of this tells me we still have a way to go before we reach a gold standard of understanding what the FMC is telling us during these Confirm … Execute exchanges; and that VNAV is still (at times) damn confusing. Well, that last part I definitely knew.

Some time ago I wrote about a review of a Decision Making Model (FORDEC). During that article I clarified that there is a clear difference between a Decision Making Model versus a Non Normal Management Model. Usually you have to deal with the NNM first before you get as far into the flight as having to make real decisions with conflicting information and requirements. I’m using ANC AAM – Aviate Navigate Communicate – Assess Action Manage.

Please note that :

(a) Diagrams are NOT my forte; and
(b) I’m NOT doing anything new here.

Non Normal Management Model – ANC AAM

Many pilots, in most situations, have no need of a non-normal management model to follow. Their training, practice and experience combined with SOPs and the support of a good PM/PF to take them through most NNM events to a good result without incident.

However outside of these beneficial influences, pilots at the beginning of their careers; pilots who don’t benefit from a common structure that promotes functioning as part of a team on the flight deck; pilots new to type, to a set of SOPs, to a Company; pilots experiencing a NNM the like of which they haven’t been directly trained for – in all of these situations a common management model framework brings direction and control to a NNM event. Encouraging both process and flow through the procedures while emphasising the importance of the basics – Blue Side Up; Power + Attitude = Performance; Who’s Flying The Plane?; and all that good stuff.

It must be appreciated that ANC (most particularly Aviate) underpins all NNM management. At no point should the instructor be able to lean forward and ask that terrible question – “So … Who’s Flying The Plane?“

Aviate Navigate Communicate (ANC)

ANC is an axiomatic industry standard to assist crew in task prioritisation at any stage of flight – not just during NNMs.

• Aviate emphasises aircraft flight path and control – both PF controlling flight path; PM monitoring both flight path and the PF.
• Navigate is a priority with the inherent aspects of Terrain Clearance; awareness of Weather and other wider navigation goals – including ATC compliance.
• Communicate follows once aircraft flight path is assured and short term navigation has been agreed and implemented by the crew.

Assess Action Manage?(AAM)

AAM structures the less immediate non-normal handling sequences for the crew. When a NNM presents (after ANC) AAM inputs flow and process to the next crew response to the NNM event.

• An Assessment phase requires crew to slow down, review indications and think prior to selecting the …
• Action which can range from Memory Items, NNM checklist, or just the agreement that an immediate response is not required. After that …
• Management of the NNM at the end of AAM release the crew into more traditional handling aspects of decisions relating to Return/Diversion; Weather and Terrain assessment; Aircraft Configuration Impact; Passenger Needs; Aircraft Performance Impact – and how these impact back on the Return/Diversion decision.

Note that at either the Assessment or Management phase the crew may well be required to utilise a Decision Making Model when the correct resolution is not clear to all involved – or especially if there’s conflicting views on the best (that is, safest) way forward.

Change (not as good as a Holiday)

Should the scenario change (such as a change to the NNM; an additional NNM; change to the conditions of weather/fuel/passengers, etc) – the pilot may well be required to abandon the current process (whether in the midst of Navigate/Communicate or Assess/Action/Manage) – and return to Aviate – Fly The Plane.

Sample Scenario : Engine Failure After Takeoff (EFATO)

During takeoff, an engine malfunction (severe damage) results in a failed engine with the additional loss of a hydraulic system. Apart from thrust loss, the primary means of flap retraction has also failed. The PF has dealt with the initial yaw response of the failure and safely delivered the aircraft to 400 ft, where the memory items associated with any applicable NNM checklist would normally be commenced. What do the crew do now?

Aviate Navigation Communicate – Assess Action Manage

Aviate : Flight path always remains the highest calling for both the PF and the PM. Power, Attitude and Performance are the active task of the PF; monitoring remains the primary task of the PM to keep the aircraft safe.

Navigate : In this specific NNM – the PF/PM must consider the requirement for any Engine Out Procedure (EOP) to keep the aircraft clear of terrain. The EOP takes priority over everything else other than Aviate. Note that while navigation has come in at 400 ft during this narrative – it’s entirely possible that a turn may have been required earlier to comply with an EOP that keeps the aircraft clear of obstacles close in on the takeoff flightpath.

Communicate : Communications can be a priority for several reasons – whether to advise the intention to deviate from clearance to satisfy the requirements of the EOP; or to ensure that ATC are in the picture to be able to offer assistance when it becomes required. Of course, Aviate/Navigate remains a priority over Communicate.

Assess : Having ensured ANC, the crew now need to assess the required response to the NNM. In this situation, this is a formalised assessment of the EICAS and engine failure indications as well as any immediate requirements of a hydraulic system loss (this is a 777 – there aren’t any). In this situation – it’s a formalised assessment of EICAS commencing with an EICAS message Review (noting both Engine and Hydraulic failure indications) as well as assessing airframe vibration indications. In this case – checklist memory items will be required.

Action : The PF now calls for the action phase, “Engine Severe Damage Separation Left Memory Items“. Both crew are involved in actioning the checklist memory items. As always – ANC remains paramount with both PF and PM required to ensure/monitor flight path and compliance with the EOP during the Action phase.

Manage : Management commences after the required Assess/Action responses to the NNM are complete. By this time the aircraft is clean, clear of terrain and any relevant NNM and NM checklists are complete. Management at this point necessitates Decision Making – in which FORDEC may be required. The aircraft is damaged, with a landing performance impact from both the engine and hydraulic failures. These and other Facts?such as weather and terrain will require the crew to determine and evaluate the available Options?and the?Risk/Benefit to flight those options present, before agreeing on a Decision as to a course of action. Once a decision is reached the crew will Execute the decision along with all the necessary communication of intent that implies. Any good decision making process requires follow up and at some point the crew must implement a positive?Check that the outcomes are as expected.

ANC AAM – Circles within Circles

ANC and AAM do not exist in isolation. ANC overrides any sequence of events from the beginning to the end of the flight. AAM is continually in use during various phases of flight in response to stimuli external to the crew – for example:

• During acceleration and cleanup after takeoff, the failed hydraulic system results in the EICAS alert [] FLAPS PRIMARY. The crew response? First response is always ANC – Fly The Aircraft. The crew will Assess the failure, understanding that the FLAPS PRIMARY alert indicates that the flaps are attempting (and succeeding) to retract using the secondary (electric) system. As such, the only Action required is perhaps to monitor airspeed as flap retraction will be slow and speed intervention may be required to keep clear of the flap limit speed. The flap system failure will involve itself later in the Management phase as a Fact when deciding the final disposition of the flight.
• Having completed the acceleration and flap retraction phase of the takeoff – the crew have to decide what to do next. ANC requires that the crew ensure continued safe flight path, and suggests the requirement to make a short term Navigation decision. This navigation decision is typically between continuing away from the departure airfield; holding in the area; or diverting to a takeoff alternate. Much of this decision making is often made on the ground as part of the departure brief.

The 777 EICAS incorporates AAM principles as part of the EICAS Review / Memory Items / Checklist / Notes /Non-Normal before Normal methodology. During the above scenario, EICAS prompts crew during the takeoff (within the bounds of takeoff inhibits) with a series of alert messages (Warning, Caution, _Advisory) – some of which have checklists, some of those checklists require early completion of memory items. ANC requires that crew ignore these during the first critical phase of flight to 400 ft (unless Aviate is compromised). At 400 ft with ANC established the crew Assess the need for a response and Action the required memory items.

Some time ago I wrote down all that I had been taught and learned about operating the Boeing 777 Electronic Checklist (ECL) in conjunction with the onboard Electronic Indication and Crew Alert System (EICAS). I’ve updated it along the way as I became an instructor and it’s become more and more of a formal document along the way.

Now it’s here on Infinidim. The disclaimer below says it all – read at your own risk.

If you have any comments, corrections or suggestions, please let me know in the Comments at the bottom of this post.

EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System) is the centralised system for monitoring the normal (NM) and non-normal (NNM) status of modern Boeing aircraft. It is a one stop shop for engine indications and crew alerting and in combination with the Electronic Checklist (ECL), providing a human centric set of problem solving tools for modern aircraft.

This document does not seek to explain the basic mechanics of EICAS or ECL and assumes that you already have the relevant systems and procedural knowledge from the Boeing FCOM, QRH, FCTM and some practical experience. Instead here I explain the philosophy behind EICAS and ECL, providing a consistent framework for all crew to use as a basis for handling EICAS messages, ECL NM and NNM checklists and NNM events in a consistent manner, using the best practice CRM/NTS principles of the modern multi crew cockpit. You will also find some handling tips that have come from experience with the aircraft.

You may find some of the procedures and techniques documented here somewhat pedantic and stilted, but they are intended to produce a level playing field in the handling of NNM events across crew of varied language skills, company cultures, experience levels and degrees of fatigue – these procedures become second nature with repetition.

Note that nothing in this document should be considered authoritative over any procedures found in the Boeing Normal Procedures (NP’s). The NP’s and your airline Flight Operations Manual document are overriding.

Finally, note that while most of the contents is applicable to all 777 models, a few items (such as 5.9 Engine In Flight Start Envelope) are specific to the B777-300ER with GE90 Engines.

Disclaimer

This document is based on extensive research and operational experience of the Boeing EICAS/ECL found in the 777, in conjunction with documented procedures in the Boeing 777 QRH, FCTM and FCOM. Material incorporated in this guide is taken from all three of the relevant Boeing documents, as well as Boeing publications from issues of Airliner magazine and other sources.

As such this document is to be regarded as secondary in precedence to all these reference texts and should not be actively referred to with respect to operation of the aircraft.

Additionally this document incorporates techniques that have been developed and tested in conjunction with Simulator Training but not validated in operation of the aircraft, and must be read with caution.

The pilots of many airlines have a procedural flow or checklist of items they review after the aircraft reaches cruising altitude. These are rarely documented in Airlines SOPs and even more rarely are they based on anything from the manufacturer. This is because fundamentally today’s airliners pretty much tell you what (it believes) you need to know, when (it believes) you need to know it when it comes to aircraft systems status. The pilots monitor fuel usage, flight progress, geographical situation with respect to enroute airports and the weather at those airports – but for the most part the aircraft keeps truckin’ on irrespective of how attentive the pilots are to the flight. Did I just write myself out of a job?

Top of Climb checks are traditionally the domain of the Training Department. Often personal techniques spread across instructors and training departments until eventually most of the company is performing a drill based on a (perhaps) a relatively common understanding, but damn little basis in documentation. Generally this means crew are doing something they don’t really understand, and don’t really understand why – to the point where they become very serious and pedantic about it. Inevitably this results in a kick back and in a reactionary move the trainers are advised to stop teaching any form of top of climb checks since the manufacturer doesn’t specify one. This lasts for a while until someone starts doing one and it catches on through the students to other instructors and then to the line … and the circle of life goes on.

At a recent training meeting there was a call for a documented top of climb check. Spirited discussion pared this down to the essentials and it was agreed to document one in the P&T. Thus I am surrendering to the Circle of Life …

Practices & Techniques : Top Of Climb Checks

Fuel/Time on OFP

The TOC Time/Fuel should be recorded expeditiously on the OFP against the appropriate waypoint. The enables the calculation of climb fuel/time and can be compared against ACARS Departure Report Takeoff Fuel to also calculate Taxi Fuel. Note the Fuel On Board at TOC is not a particularly accurate reflection of fuel progress against Minimum Required fuel (MINR) – the first waypoint after TOC provides the first accurate indication of fuel status.

Aircraft Trim

Once the aircraft has stabilised in cruise, aircraft trim should be reviewed. It’s unusual for one of our aircraft to require more than one unit of rudder trim; but it’s not unusual for some rudder trim to be required.

The FCTM provides two rudder trim techniques, the second of which is required in the event of excessive rudder trim or aileron displacement as the result of the first technique. An excessive requirement for rudder trim should potentially be recorded in the aircraft maintenance log.

As the aircraft burns fuel and progresses through the flight, trim setting should progressively be reviewed.

OFP Preparation

OFP Preparation is covered in detail elsewhere (Practices & Techniques : Filling in a Flight Plan) but the following areas need addressing shortly after top of climb:

• Completion of the Departure Times/Fuels (Out, Off, Ramp Fuel etc)
• Navigation Log Waypoint Times to the end of the OFP
• EDTO Contingency Summary Page

NOTAM / Weather / INTAM / NTC Review

The pre-flight environment is hectic and often time poor. The essences of the pre-flight documentation review is to ensure a legal and safe dispatch. The review of all Enroute Airport NOTAMS/Weather and FIR specific NOTAMS is not a requirement of this phase of flight.

However once established in cruise, it’s crucial that the flight crew review completely all the documentation provided for the flight by Navigation Services. The impact of NOTAMS & Weather at non-EDTO airfields and FIR NOTAMS should be reviewed and if necessary notes made to provide this information to the relief crew for the next handover. Since it’s often NOT the Primary Crew who review Departure/Destination/Alternate Weather and NOTAMS during pre-flight – this is the time for those areas to be reviewed in detail to ensure nothing was missed.

Systems Review ( [Very] Optional )

If desired, the PF can consider a system review of the aircraft at top of climb. It must be noted that this is for personal awareness only and is not a required procedure. When reviewing systems pages, you’re not expecting to see anything unusual – that should have been notified by EICAS.

• EFIS  ENG  for Secondary Engine Indications (leave displayed)
• EICAS Recall (Messages, Exceedences) – Cancel
• EFIS STAT review Status Messages.
• EFIS ELEC / HYD / FUEL / AIR / DOOR / GEAR /FCTL  Systems Pages
• FCTL –> Consider Aircraft Trim and trim the rudder as necessary
• CHKL – Should show the Descent Checklist …
• FMC VNAV ENG OUT Maximum Altitude/Speed for Enroute terrain awareness.

I should mention that each of these systems pages should be reviewed for normal operation. Think carefully before you decide something is no normal (especially if there’s no associated EICAS/STATUS message …)

After this, the FMC FIX and ALTN pages can be prepared for EDTO Alternates / Enroute Situational Awareness.

Sometimes during a NNM in the simulator you see that when landing configuration is established, and the aircraft is being manoeuvred around the approach at the minimum flap manoeuvre speed – a further speed reduction will be required to set the NNM checklist specified reference speed (plus 5 knots). Exactly when to set this speed often becomes a discussion point in the debrief …

The most common error is to forget to reduce the speed and fly the approach and landing at the minimum flap speed, rather than reduce it to final approach speed for final approach and landing. This results in a slightly longer landing distance.

The next most common error is to reduce speed too early – the aircraft is left manoeuvring (turning, levelling) at several knots below minimum flap speed.

The correct technique is to set final approach speed – when on final approach. That is, when established on final descent straight in to the runway.

Practices & Techniques : 5.39 Setting Final Approach Speed … On Final.

There is (what can only be described as) a software bug  in the Thrust Reference setting software in the 777. While this bug manifests itself in several situation on normal and non-normal operations, it manifests significantly with flight safety implications during VNAV engine out approaches.

I discovered this issue back in the late 90’s when I was working in the Sim. I kept noticing it and writing it up for the Sim Engineers to fix. They would report back that they’d fixed it (or couldn’t understand what was wrong); another instructor would review the fix and miss-understand what the original report was about, and clear the fault. Then later I’d see it again, and report it – and round and round we went.

Eventually the Sim Engineers hunted me down and got me to show them exactly what the problem was – which I did. We all referred to the FCOM, agreed that it was not working, but then one of the S/Eng asked me “What does the Aircraft do?”. Hum. I said – so I went and checked. Lo and Behold – the Sim wasn’t the problem, the aircraft was. Oops.

I brought this to the attention of several levels of  Training/Technical management, without much interest, so I circulated an e-mail amongst instructors and ensure my students were aware of it.

In early 2000’s – A friend of mine at Cathay approached me about it (someone sent him the email) and they chased it down with CAE/Boeing as well (to no avail as far as I can work out – the anomaly is still there). Then about 3 years ago a pilot upgrading to Command at Ek was commencing an engine out NPA into a high altitude airport in Africa – and managed to stall the aircraft because of this (actually I would suggest there was some SA involved as well). This kicked of another flurry of investigation – including approaching me for details (which amused me greatly since I’d left the airline and come to V). But again – nothing much seems to have come from that – because the anomaly is still there …

Boeing’s airplane design is such that GA (Go Around) is set as the thrust limit (displayed above the N1 indication) any time the flaps are extended (FCOM 04.20.16 refers) or the glide slope is captured. One assumes that Boeing’s intent was that GA should remain the thrust limit to either Landing or the Go-Around in order to provide maximum available thrust for manoeuvring while configured for landing.

However when VNAV is engaged after flaps have been extended, the Thrust Limit is reset to CRZ. Irrespective of the demands of the situation (Weight, Density Altitude, Configuration, Selected Airspeed, etc) – by design the auto throttle cannot command more than this selected Thrust Limit – CRZ.

In most normal ops situations this reduced thrust limit is adequate to preserve airspeed irrespective of configuration (Engine Out, Gear, Flap) – particularly in the 777-300ER. But 777’s with less thrust such as the -300/-200, or in performance limiting situations such as weight in excess of MALW, high density altitudes, etc – insufficient thrust can exist to maintain airspeed/altitude.

Prior to a low speed excursion, stick shaker activation and AP stall protection, the problem can be corrected by :

• Selecting GA through the FMC Thrust Lim page;
• Pressing the CLB/CON switch (only CON* thrust limit will be selected, not GA);
• Simply pushing the thrust levers forward (a disconnect for Manual Thrust is probably the better suggestion).

* While CON thrust should be enough to maintain speed at maximum landing weight, higher weights may require even more thrust.

Scenario Description

Assume a 777 at maximum landing weight, approaching the final approach fix (FAF) at platform altitude for an Engine Out NPA. The crew intend to use VNAV for the approach, but have manoeuvred to the initial approach altitude using Basic Modes (FLCH / VS). Configured correctly at Flap 5/Flap 5 Speed, thrust reference will most likely be GA, set automatically when the Flaps were extended.

At 3 nm from the FAF, Gear Down/Flaps 20/Flap 20 speed is selected. Thrust levers retard to slow the aircraft to Flaps 20 speed. Meanwhile the PF will set the minima in the altitude select window on the MCP, check track, engage VNAV PATH and speed intervene.

However with the selection of VNAV, CRZ thrust reference is set – unnoticed by the crew. As the aircraft approaches Flap 20 speed, thrust levers advance in anticipation to achieve speed stability (giving the PF the tactile feedback expected of thrust maintaining speed), but thrust is now limited by CRZ thrust. On a Bad Day, Engine Out with the combination of near maximum landing weight and/or high density altitude, CRZ thrust is insufficient to maintain speed, but often enough to preclude a negative speed trend indication. Speed will now continue to reduce until (a) descent for the approach commences, (b) an increase thrust limit is set; or (c) stick shaker/stall protection.

Speed Protection? At minimum manoeuvring speed, low speed protection would normally kick in (minimum AFDS speed or eventually auto throttle wakeup), but in this case this protective feature is limited by the CRZ thrust limit setting. The only low speed protection (through the autopilot) that will function is stall protection – as the aircraft approaches stick shaker speed, it will pitch forward and descend with failed FMA AFDS mode indications.

Prior to a low speed excursion and stick shaker activation, the problem can be corrected by selecting GA through the FMC Thrust Lim page or pressing the CLB/CON switch (CON thrust limit only will be selected) – or simply pushing the thrust levers forward – whether disconnecting the A/THR first or not. CON thrust should be enough to maintain speed at maximum landing weight. Higher weights may require more thrust.

Additionally …

• On all approaches (after flap selection), FLCH may set CLB/CON, but glide slope intercept will reset to TO/GA.
• TO/GA switch FMA mode activation sets GA thrust, so GA thrust limit is set during all go-arounds.
• Flap extension beyond 22.5° sets GA thrust limit.

This anomaly does not impact on other NNM procedures (such as Windshear and GPWS). These recalls require either TO/GA Switch activation and/or manual thrust.