The Boeing 787 is certainly a revolutionary step from anything Boeing has done recently – and from anything else Boeing seems to have planned in the future it would seem, judging by the 737-Max. From what I can glean on the web, the 737 Max while incorporating some revolutionary technologies in the engines and airframe – is […]
With pilots coming from a number of other aircraft types and several different airlines, including a domestic fleet, standardisation can be a challenge. The use of Flaps on approach has been in particular an interesting issue, which is hopefully address clearly in the following article.
It’s not unusual – especially during Line Training (instructors beware) for your student to generate an EICAS MAIN GEAR STEERING alert during the initial takeoff run. This results from advancing thrust prior to the main articulated gear achieving a lock during the initial takeoff roll.
So … for the second time in 2 years and the third time in 25 … I’m doing another Type Rating. This time it’s the Boeing 737NG and it’s very … different. For the first thing – I have LOTS of time. As practically every other pilot who’s ever gone through a type rating knows […]
For the last decade or so, I have been working on a document called Boeing 777 Procedures and Techniques. It has it’s genesis in what was originally a Common Errors document based on observations of Pilot/Student actions in the Simulator – but most particularly Instructor/Examiner activity in the Brief/Sim/Debrief as well. If you would like […]
Many Airlines (or more accurately the Trainers of the Training Department) specify a series of checks at Top Of Climb. Often there’s no basis in this from an Airline SOP’s or Manufacturers point of view – which doesn’t mean they’re not valuable for situational awareness …
We are reviewing Decision Making Models at the moment. On the 777, we’ve used FORDEC, which is very close to the European model, except we’ve replaced “Check” with “Communicate”, which may or may not have been a good thing. Other fleets in our airline are using GRADE or NMATE. There are several reasons why Decision […]
The Airspeed Unreliable scenarios is one of the more challenging non normals faced by pilots in the simulator. Of the many serious malfunctions I’ve witnessed crew deal with in the simulator – this one more than any other has caught crew out to the point of a serious limitation exeedence (high/low airspeed) or potentially an […]
A runway change can be highly destructive to mental model the crew establish during preflight of the aircraft departure. Dozens of decisions, selections and entries are often required to be evaluated and implemented – often while the engines are running and aircraft are waiting behind you.
In another article, I discuss the issue of acceleration and cleanup in the missed approach. The Boeing 777 FCTM mentions accelerating at 1000 ft (AAL) in the missed approach, and many airlines use this point on two engine missed approaches. As discussed – this is inappropriate and potentially dangerous in the event of a single […]
The recent phase training combined Engine Failure with Flaps/Slats Drive/Control failures introduced the issue of entering a reference speed when two different checklist are specifying two different Vref settings.
The last phase of recurrent simulator training included a two engine go-around after a Slats Drive failure. For no apparent reason the AP/FD pitches to less than 10 degrees and accelerates well through Flap Limit speed. According to Boeing, this is expected behavior.
A while ago I was looking into tail clearances on takeoff, rotation technique and most importantly what tools were available to train and evaluate rotation technique in the simulator and the aircraft. As part of this review the question was raised about the calling of “Rotate” on takeoff and the initiation of the rotation manoeuvre […]
Friend and fellow podcaster Karlene Pettit recently blogged on managing the A330 speed/configuration during approach. I thought it might be interesting to explore the topic on the 777. The point of Karlene’s article is that often the manfacturer’s profile doesn’t comply with the ATC environment we find ourselves in, and the performance characteristics of the aircraft we fly are such […]
I’ve been sitting on this post for nearly two years. I originally developed the content for internal discussions within our Standards Department as the result of an occurrence on a check; then further developed it as I discussed the issues raised with my fellow Checkers; along with Checkers and Standards Managers from several other airlines. […]